Why doesn’t Defence Acquisition work?

by Dr Richard Davis

In “Why doesn’t Defence Acquisition work?”, Dr Richard Davis argues that persistent underperformance in UK defence acquisition stems primarily from two systemic issues: flawed organisational structures and insufficient professional competence within the Civil Service.

On organisation, the author highlights the failure to maintain unified project authority. The late-1990s “Smart Acquisition” reforms introduced Integrated Project Teams (IPTs), which successfully concentrated responsibility, resources, and decision-making under a single leader. However, these structures were gradually undermined by entrenched functional hierarchies - particularly in finance and commercial domains - which reasserted control and diluted project leaders’ authority. This fragmentation has led to delays, inefficiencies, and cost overruns, as decisions are slowed by competing priorities and lack of accountability.

The expansion of assurance and approvals processes has compounded the problem. Originally intended to improve governance, these functions have evolved into bureaucratic gatekeepers, adding layers of scrutiny that consume significant project time - often over 30% - without improving outcomes. Similarly, the introduction of Senior Responsible Officers (SROs) has failed to resolve accountability issues, as they are held responsible for delivery without being granted meaningful authority over resources or decision-making.

On competence, Davis contrasts the rigorous training, structured career management, and professional development of the Army with the comparatively weak systems in the Civil Service. Civil servants often lack formal training, consistent career pathways, and the specialist expertise - particularly in commercial skills - required for complex acquisition programmes. This capability gap has driven heavy reliance on expensive contractors, undermining long-term institutional strength.

These structural and competence issues contribute to a risk-averse, process-driven culture characterised by weak accountability, fragmented teamwork, and slow decision-making. In contrast to the Army’s decisive, outcome-focused ethos, the Civil Service prioritises compliance and consensus, often at the expense of effectiveness.

The author concludes that meaningful reform requires restoring unified project leadership with full authority over all resources, dismantling excessive central oversight, and significantly investing in Civil Service capability through improved recruitment, training, and career management. In the short term, he advocates greater integration with industry to leverage external expertise. Ultimately, he argues that these changes would not only improve delivery performance but also reduce costs, offering a compelling case for reform.

Link to full article.