Lessons for today’s manoeuvre signallers (and others) and their preparation for readiness

The macro themes from the operations of 7 Armd Bde HQ & Sig Sqn (207) in Iraq in 2003 are based around: training as you will fight, including manoeuvre and the full analogue/digital services suite; and understanding your data collection, coherence, collaboration and curation. The last 20 years has left a void in genuine tactical ground manoeuvre warfighting skills, and this goes alongside the gradual erosion of operational experience. Despite training hard in manoeuvre warfare and reading in detail the lessons learnt from Operation GRANBY, in 2003 a lot of lessons were ‘re-learnt’ the hard way. Those signallers at the centre of the British ground manoeuvre operations have compared their recollections to CGS’ recent ‘Op MOBILISE’ direction to the Army to offer insight for signallers preparing for a wide range of possible future conflicts.

CGS Theme 1 - Boosting the readiness of UK troops.

7 Armoured Brigade had finished a Brigade Training year the previous November, regularly exercising throughout the year from Battle Group, through to Brigade and Divisional level. This gave a sound manoeuvre foundation for Operation TELIC. We exercised regularly with our staff.

The key readiness observations for a signals unit are:

• The training continuum is crucial and should encompass three areas: the status of the network; the capabilities on the network; and the staff. Including attachments and detachments is crucial. The mantra ‘train as you fight’ is still relevant.

• Develop and plan against multiple scenarios as when the real situation changes, prior thinking can be applied to the new reality. Training is an excuse to celebrate failure, so think how bad it could be, engineer that scenario in training and see how to operate the network.

• Be prepared to operate anywhere geographically – always take the opportunity to exercise abroad if you can. If you cannot exercise abroad – research!

• With the loss of operational DNA, mental preparation is a crucial element of readiness. Learning to operate with minimal sleep under arduous physical and mental conditions is difficult to achieve in training, so it should be discussed openly as part of that training as a minimum.

CGS Theme 2 – Accelerating the modernisation of the military

In 2003 the absence of an electromagnetic warfare or air threat permitted centralisation of communications assets at the HQ for mutual physical protection and support. However, there was no ability to easily transfer data / documents both laterally and to the Divisional HQ across the battlefield. Media sticks, photocopies and trace maps were disseminated by despatch riders. Modernising communications systems often means that they get smaller and require a greatly reduced workforce. Vice mutual support through a communications hub, tomorrow’s HQs will need to be more dispersed to survive. This will require better physical protection, especially in a more porous and ill-defined battlespace but notably the volume of data will bring its own challenges to being able to manoeuvre effectively.

The key observations for accelerating modernisation are:

• The duties of first line physical protection, including operating various weapon systems, should be included as part of modernisation.

• Make sure priority is given to data classification, security, dissemination and storage. Crucially understand, and practice, how data will steer the ‘PACE’ plan.

• Buying COTS can work but test it in all appropriate environments …. or have a great supply chain to replenish broken equipment.

CGS Theme 3: ‘We will re-think how we fight’

Operation TELIC was fought with a traditional view of Command and Control (C2), centralised on HQs and commanders. It was ‘combined arms’ but there was little Coalition CIS, bar a couple of Liaison Officers. This led to dangerous ‘Blue on Blue’ situations, but more worryingly it lost the ability to collect the intelligence. Even with a limited enemy threat, the HQ layout constantly adapted to open desert, aircraft hangers, buildings of opportunity and finally inside a palace. The ability to modify a HQ to your environment, and indeed threat, is a skill in itself. We were also responsible for moving the staff, usually in the back of the staff vehicles, but we were trained over the prior 2½ years of operational tours and an intensive training year including deployments to BATUS, Poland and training areas throughout Germany, and conducted a divisional level manoeuvre exercise. Deploying away from camp and functioning on exercise or operations for sustained periods was in our DNA, we prided ourselves on it. Any deployment on exercise is a real opportunity, overseas an even greater one, especially if working with Allies and Partners. Any form of operational experience prized above all. Digitalisation will drive many more users of data in the battlespace, all of whom will want access to a network. Many functions not currently considered to be Formation C2 will demand apps on devices to make their tasks easier. This dispersal of data processing could reduce the strain on HQs, but the increased demand for network access will increase the demands for those who provide the network and enabling services. Given the size of today’s HQs, the ability to move staff at a pace and in a platform that suits the threat and movement of the battle needs to be considered.

The key observations to ‘re-think how we would fight’.

• Wider dispersal of HQs and the ability of functional areas being able to operate with more mission command. Modern technology should enable this, but requires a more flexible network.

• Signals units must be able to deliver the appropriately analysed data to enable C2 and situational awareness at all levels and as part of a seamless trusted part of a coalition network/system.

• Incorporate dismounting HQs into buildings of opportunity, and all too rare skill which does require specialist ‘dismounting’ equipment.

Any form of deployment away from the home base should be seized upon as an opportunity.

CGS Theme 4: ‘Look again at the structure of our Army’ – ruthless prioritisation

7 Armoured Brigade was not organically resourced for the operation that took place. In 2002 the transition to ‘wartime’ establishments was assumed to allow many months to mobilise, something today’s Army cannot afford or expect. Enacting a recognised War Fighting Establishment brought a significant workforce uplift. Luckily, a sister Brigade (4th Armoured Brigade) provided most of this; they were well trained, and they ‘knew’ Clansman and Ptarmigan. A notable number came from other units and the Territorial Army, with little experience in armoured manoeuvre or our communications equipment. It is not simple to combine two ‘peacetime’ units to make one ‘warfighting’ unit. We must also not lose sight or expectation that high-end warfighting generates the need for battle casualty replacements. Their preparation - training and readiness - should be considered. A major concern throughout was the supply chain. 102 Log Bde had its own communications network, though it was on the Brigade Command net. The DCOS was often heard to mutter about his limited means of communication. What is more concerning today is the cyber vulnerability of the supply chain. Considering the well-known importance of logistics, this is an area that needs to be revisited.

The key observations we would make about the structure of our Army are:

• Signals units must have the equipment and resources in peacetime that it wishes to use and operate in wartime, or have a resourced and rehearsed augmentation process. This is not only to enable a combined arms operation, but also the ability to fight within a Coalition.

• Logistic units need to be part of the integrated combined arms and coalition communications solution.

Link to full article.