Desert Armour: Tank Warfare in North Africa: Gazala to Tunisia , 1942–43

By Robert Forczyk

he book, Forczyk forcefully argues that this model of high intensity air-ground offensive operations remains valid for study and emulation in the 21st century. His emphasis throughout is on the importance of combined arms training, particularly for senior leadership, of logistics, and of the proper application of firepower.

Forczyk’s style, as has been seen in his previous works, is to make use of large amounts of detail to illustrate wider points. He will describe complex technical particulars of equipment are described, show precise numbers of equipment and personnel, all supported with ample appendices and notes. While the reader may occasionally struggle through these sections, it is more than made up for by how he effectively combines it all with his tactical and operational narratives to make his point. As an example, Forczyk uses a detailed description of exactly how many tanks, trucks and other equipment (down to exact varieties of each) were left to the British in June 1942 to effectively illustrate how even initial numerical and technical overmatch can be wasted in piecemeal actions against an aggressive enemy. Even at its most complex, however, the book is never a slog, and his point is always clearly and effectively communicated in understandable modern doctrinal terminology.

Forczyk is particularly apt at illustrating many issues and situations familiar to the modern soldier, at all levels of war. There isn’t a soldier alive who doesn’t feel the pain of the Troop Commander told to move toward Benghazi, then away, then back toward it while cold, wet, miserable and not knowing what on earth was going on. The author’s previous experience as a soldier means that he is very good at understanding how confused things can get at the tactical level, particularly when one is faced with poor leadership at the upper levels. Similarly, any Ukrainian logistician confronted with sustaining Challenger IIs, Leopard IIs and M1A1 Abrams in the field can sympathise with the struggles of the British support units being required to ensure that the correct fuel, ammunition and spares went to the correct types of tanks at the correct units.

An aspect of the book which readers may find controversial is his treatment of the various sides. Frequently condemnatory of Rommel and of the British senior officers in particular, he is visibly more sympathetic to the Americans and Italians. This is particularly apparent when they perform poorly: the British and Germans are condemned as logistically incompetent, confused or lacking the necessary aggression, while the Italians are described as hamstrung by the Germans and their equipment and the Americans by their lack of experience. I personally appreciate his defence of the Italians, who are often unreasonably maligned for incompetence and cowardice, especially by the British at the time. Forczyk offers several examples of sound Italian operational and tactical thinking, including some very good soldiering by the ‘Folgore’ Division’s anti-tank gunners against Harding’s 7th Armoured Division at Miteirya Ridge. His willingness to forgive the American sins of Kasserine Pass may, however, be a step too far. Much of this differs from the wider historiography, and I suspect will lead to significant debate. He does however make his arguments very persuasively and backs them up with yet more exhaustive data. This may therefore lead to a wider re-evaluation of certain senior officers reputations – on all sides.

The book’s major flaw, however, is the mapping. Maps appear infrequently, without enough useful detail, sometimes in the wrong places. The map provided to illustrate Operation LIGHTFOOT appears in the sub-chapter dedicated to its successor, Operation SUPERCHARGE. In a particularly bad example, an extremely vague map meant to accompany the description of Operation ABERDEEN appears 134 pages after the action it describes. Given the complexity of the battles, and given how well-researched and well-written the book is, it is a disappointment.

Overall, this is a fantastic second part, and I would thoroughly recommend it to anyone interested in armoured warfare or the North Africa campaign in general. It will appeal to the technical aficionado and the amateur alike with its combination of detail and assortment of tactical vignettes. Given the prevalence of armoured operations in modern Ukraine, its lessons about combined arms, logistics and the application of firepower are particularly relevant to the modern soldier. While I would recommend having alternative mapping handy, its impeccable, evidence-based analysis will go a long way to destroying myths on all sides.

Lieutenant James Millington

Published by Osprey Publishing, 384 pages

ISBN 978-1472859846