Command

By Lawrence Freedman.

I was excited to review Command by Lawrence Freedman as there are two things I really like about Penguin paperbacks. Firstly, they are always the same size and look great lined up on the bookshelf, and secondly the brand almost guarantees an interesting, high quality read no matter the subject.

Freedman’s key argument is that in essence, a commander issues orders that are to be obeyed without question, regardless of any misgivings the recipients may have. This is necessary within a country’s armed forces due to the specific responsibilities placed on military personnel. Whilst commands must be obeyed, there is scope for how they are obeyed, and this often provides room to undermine the senior commander or politician issuing orders whether for fair reasons or foul. Likewise, commanders can manipulate subordinates by issuing ambiguous or delayed orders or by failing to issue orders at all.

Freedman explores the concept that whilst the military has the capability to overthrow the government, it should willingly subordinate itself to the civilian executive. Such subordination is not always in the best interests of the military, and there are a great number of problems caused by politicians that arise from this. These include the effects of political ambivalence, the tacit approval of illegal methods of warfare and the notion that military objectives ordered by a government may be proactively undermined by its concurrent diplomatic efforts. Politicians may issue orders to military commanders which may compromise the lives or moral integrity of both soldiers and the electorate. Should the military therefore be able to deny the legitimacy of the civil authority in the greater interest of the State?

This book highlights the tension between the political and military spheres very well. It is interesting to understand how the political will of a government is translated into military power, and how in many cases the success or failure of each of these functions of a state are symbiotically related to each other. Whilst military failure may cause a government to lose popular support, the converse is true. Weak direction from the government may lead to military defeat as well. When situations such as those contained within the book are mixed with the at times huge egos of the politicians and military commanders responsible for making the decisions it seems incredible that we have circumnavigated World War 3 so far. Freedman’s selection of vignettes begins in the aftermath of WW2 and all are compelling, but my favourite ones to read were his analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Falklands conflict, and his study of Saddam Hussein.

The chapter on the Cuban missile crisis shows how strong civilian leadership, and the correct choice of commanders can prevent situations from over escalating due to an overzealous response. Kennedy ordered a proportionate response to the crisis which critics within the military deemed as ‘appeasement’. Soviet submarines armed with nuclear torpedoes and poor radio communications back to the USSR had a level of mission command where they could have launched nuclear warheads. It was through the good judgment and restraint of commanders on both sides that nuclear Armageddon was avoided whilst the governments negotiated a resolution.

Freedman is the chief UK historian of the Falklands conflict, and his analysis of the situation is first rate. In this instance, the Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was depending on a swift resolution to the conflict to circumnavigate the Regan administration’s pressure to negotiate terms with Argentina. This led to conflicting views on what the primary objectives should be. In the end, it was Goose Green which became the focus, setting the conditions for victory. Freedman explains how the trust Thatcher placed in her military commanders, and the lack of suitable long-range communications equipment helped to ensure mission command and prevent too much interference from senior commanders and politicians in London.

His analysis of Saddam Hussein considers the issue of command from the perspective of an autocratic dictator. In stark contrast to the trust and reliance Kennedy and Thatcher placed in their commanders, Hussein’s rule was dependant on his cult of personality. Having taken control and assumed command of all the key positions of power within the Iraqi state, Hussein viewed senior military leaders as potential rivals. Freeman explains in depth how those suspected of dissent were often imprisoned or executed, and military failure often resulted in the execution of the unlucky commanders. This was not helped by the flawed criteria Hussein used to select commanders, and their frequent rotation through posts to prevent them from establishing independent power bases of their own. His commanders often lacked experience and were unwilling to bring him bad news. His reliance on his own experience ensured decisions were made without his military experts tempering advice. Ultimately, his belief that he could draw the USA into a protracted ground war akin to Vietnam following his invasion of Kuwait was a huge misstep. These miscalculations based on his own personal flawed assumptions resulting from his experience of the protracted Iran – Iraq conflict ultimately set into motion the chain of events which would lead to his downfall.

Anyone with an interest in contemporary politics or warfare is in for a great time with this excellent book. The vignettes and subsequent analysis reminded me of Robert Greene’s excellent 48 Laws of Power. Whilst the subject matter was both impeccably researched, and seriously handled Freedman injects appropriate level of humour into the proceedings. The expert selection of material allows the central argument of the book to be developed seamlessly alongside the chronological narrative of events from Korea to Ukraine. Whilst this is a lengthy read, it is packed with exciting and complex political and moral situations for the reader to contemplate. This book also made me think of the differences between command and leadership. Successful commanders must be competent leaders, but they must also have the ability to be politically astute and morally in tune with the civil society they represent as well.

Staff Sergeant (FofS) Oliver Mason.

Published by Penguin Books Ltd, 608 pages.

ISBN 978 0241456996